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NO. 48 OCTOBER 2020 Introduction 
Customs Union: Old Instrument, 
New Function in EU-Turkey Relations 
Sinem Adar, Nicola Bilotta, Aurélien Denizeau, Sinan Ekim, Dorothée Schmid, Günter Seufert, 
Ilke Toygür, and Karol Wasilewski 
The European Council’s conclusions on external relations published on 1 October 
2020 hint at the readiness of the European Union (EU) to enter into a new stage in 
its relations with Turkey. On the one hand, the EU “strongly condemns violation of 
the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus” and “calls on Turkey to abstain from 
similar actions in the future, in breach of international law”. It also insists on resolv-
ing differences “through peaceful dialogue” – a clear hint at Turkey’s extensive show 
of military might in the Mediterranean – and underlines its determination to apply 
sanctions to Turkey. On the other hand, the EU has agreed “to launch a positive politi-
cal EU-Turkey agenda with a specific emphasis on the modernisation of the Customs 
Union and trade facilitation, people-to-people contacts, High level dialogues”, and 
“continued cooperation on migration issues”. The essential condition to kick off this 
new agenda is to sustain the “constructive efforts to stop illegal activities vis-à-vis 
Greece and Cyprus”. Based on joint research conducted by six European think tanks, 
we suggest that the EU should explicitly separates the accession framework from 
the modernisation of the Customs Union. Additionally, we lay out a framework for 
the negotiations on a modernised Customs Union. 
 
Up until now, the EU has adhered to the 
decision of its General Affairs Council an-
nounced on 26 June 2018 that rules out not 
only the opening of any new chapter in the 
membership process, but also any “further 
work towards the modernisation of the EU-
Turkey Customs Union” (CU). Up until now, 
Brussels has based progress in the member-
ship process and the start of talks on the 
modernisation of the CU on two conditions: 
i) initiatives towards democratisation and 
improving rule of law, and ii) greater align-
ment with the EU’s foreign policy towards 
third countries. Yet, this strategy has not 
worked. Stalling the membership process, 
blocking negotiations on the CU, and can-
celling high-level dialogues have neither 
prevented democratic backsliding in Tur-
key, nor prompted Ankara to desist from 
the militarisation of its policy towards the 
EU member states in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean. In contrast to its unyielding posi-
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tion, the EU has continued to depend on 
Turkey’s cooperation on migration, counter-
terrorism, and defence. 
In the meantime, relations of EU coun-
tries with Turkey have deteriorated rapidly. 
Some member states, such as France, Ger-
many, and to a lesser degree Italy and 
Poland, increasingly see Turkey as a chal-
lenge to their vital interests. For others, 
Turkey has even turned into an adversary 
that is threatening their security, as is the 
case with Cyprus and Greece. Turkey piled 
refugees at the Greek border and tried to 
force Athens to permit the influx of irregu-
lar migrants. In the eyes of Brussels, Ankara 
violated the Exclusive Economic Zone of 
the Republic of Cyprus and challenged the 
sovereign rights of Greece. The Turkish 
navy intercepted Norwegian, Italian, and 
Israeli research vessels in the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone of Cyprus. Turkish warships 
at one point appeared ready to fire at ships 
of the French and Greek navies. Turkey 
temporarily blocked NATO planning for 
the Baltic states and Poland to force NATO 
members to classify Syrian Kurdish forces 
as terrorist organisations. 
Given the foreign policy challenges that 
Turkey increasingly poses to EU member 
states and the EU as a whole, Brussels’ 
earlier refusal to consider the renegotiation 
of the Customs Union – primarily due 
to Turkey’s backsliding in terms of human 
rights and the rule of law – appears more 
and more like the lieu de mémoire of a 
past decade, when the EU still thought of 
itself as having the leverage to urge Turkey 
towards democratisation. 
A Watershed Approach in the 
EU’s Policy towards Turkey 
This new reality suggests that the need for 
negotiations that utilise both carrots and 
sticks has replaced the former one-sided 
leverage the EU once had over Turkey. Up 
until recently, the EU, refusing almost all 
Turkish demands – such as visa liberalisa-
tion, high-level dialogues, and the Customs 
Union – had little to offer in bargaining 
with Ankara. Having nothing to lose in its 
relations with Europe, Ankara had no in-
centive to take the EU’s interests or those 
of EU member states into account. 
The recent apparent shift in the EU posi-
tion, thus, did not happen in a vacuum. 
The CU is perhaps the most influential tool 
that the EU can use to bargain with Turkey. 
Moreover, there is also interest in almost 
all member states for a deepened Customs 
Union. The EU General Affairs Council’s 
decision on 26 June 2018 to not open new 
chapters in the membership process is con-
sistent. It is all too obvious that Turkey no 
longer meets the Copenhagen criteria. Yet, 
the Council’s decision to apply the very 
same framework to the handling of the 
CU reflects the attitudes of France and Ger-
many in particular, and it disregards the 
leanings of other member states. 
The EU countries that were researched, 
such as Spain, Poland, Italy, Greece, and 
also France and Germany, have strong eco-
nomic interests in the deepening of the 
somewhat outdated trade agreement from 
1995. Be it the business communities or 
the ministries of trade, the main economic 
stakeholders in each of these six countries 
are cognisant of the great potentials of 
trade benefits that an extended CU could 
deliver. The panoply includes joint ventures 
in defence, renewables, the finance system, 
and construction. A new agreement could 
grant easier access to state tenders, and the 
country’s huge domestic market. It could 
utilise Turkey’s potential as a tourist-send-
ing country and allow for cabotage. Turkey 
is still seen as a promising hub for Cen-
tral Asian and Middle Eastern markets. A 
deepened CU would ensure existing value 
chains and underscore Turkey’s credibility 
as an investment destination. 
Notwithstanding these tangible benefits 
for EU member states, the political stake-
holders especially are well aware that Tur-
key would profit more from a deepened 
CU given its economic woes, evidenced by 
the decline in per capita income in recent 
years. Moreover, there is the risk that the 
upgrading of the CU might appear as a 
reward for Turkey, given its hardball stance 
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in the Eastern Mediterranean, its utilisation 
of migratory movements, its rapproche-
ment with Russia and seemingly decreasing 
level of solidarity with NATO, as well as its 
interventions in Syria, Libya, and recently 
in the Caucasus. Nevertheless, foreign policy 
concerns dominate the discussion in almost 
all countries that participated in the research. 
Thus, disentangling the renegotiation of the 
Customs Union from the accession frame-
work and making it conditional on align-
ment in foreign policy and security matters 
could help up the ante for Turkey in its uni-
lateral and militaristic foreign policy. 
In a nutshell, bringing the modernisa-
tion of the CU to the negotiation table pro-
vides the EU with the opportunity to capi-
talise on Turkey’s continued interest in the 
matter. It will help Europe to establish a 
rules-based communicative space where 
the EU and Turkey can negotiate their posi-
tions. As such, the EU can contribute to 
the de-escalation of the present conflicts 
with Turkey without jeopardising Ankara’s 
cooperation. Moreover, re-socialising Tur-
key back into diplomatic circles may help 
Europe convince Turkey to abide by agree-
ments. Last but not least, the process of 
renegotiating the Customs Union has the 
potential to help Europe create a common 
framework for relations with Turkey in 
ways that render Turkish divide-and-rule 
policies ineffective. 
Recommendations for the EU 
Brussels should, however, pay attention to 
some serious pitfalls and sort out essential 
internal differences in order to put the 
negotiations on the CU to good use while 
bargaining with Turkey. 
First and foremost, member states should 
accept that they have different views con-
cerning the political implications of a re-
negotiated Customs Union and, particularly, 
the CU’s link to Turkish membership in the 
EU. The national approaches vary consider-
ably on this. Interestingly and similarly 
to Ankara, Athens strictly opposes the idea 
that a modernised Customs Union may 
function as a substitute for Turkey’s mem-
bership. In France, out of the public eye, 
some pundits are pondering exactly this 
idea. Brussels, thus, should hold the EU ac-
cession negotiations – and, correspondingly, 
expectations towards democratisation – 
separately from the modernisation of the 
CU. This is not to suggest that the EU is no 
longer interested in Turkey’s democratic 
backsliding. It is instead an acknowledg-
ment of the limits to the EU’s normative 
power over Turkish domestic politics, on 
the one hand, and the growing necessity 
for cooperation with Turkey in realms of 
foreign policy and security, on the other. 
Secondly, the EU should prove its com-
mitment to establishing workable relations 
with Turkey. To this end, Brussels has to 
realise the highly varied discussions on the 
matter, including the CU, as well as the dif-
ferent degrees of preparedness in different 
member states. In some countries, govern-
ments, business communities, and NGOs 
have already made up their minds, whereas 
in other states the issue hardly attracts 
attention. Brussels needs to engage in stra-
tegic communication with the member 
states, drawing attention to the economic 
benefits and underlining that the upgrad-
ing of the CU is a separate issue from Tur-
key’s future in the EU. 
Thirdly, the EU should send a clear mes-
sage to Turkey that it is willing to deepen 
the existing trade agreement only if cer-
tain conditions are fulfilled. Turkey should 
address and repair the mounting number 
of trade irritants in recent years within 
the context of the current agreement. This 
situation was reported without exception 
by all the countries that participated in the 
joint research. Ankara should also observe 
its commitments to cooperation with Europe 
over migration management. As a third 
condition, Turkey should re-establish itself 
as a reliable partner for European security. 
This is only possible through a sincere 
display of interest in multilateralism and 
diplomacy. Ankara should end military 
threats in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
act according to the common interests of 
the transatlantic alliance. 
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Fourthly, the Customs Union should be 
the central – but not the only – instru-
ment of the EU to re-engage Ankara. In its 
conclusions, the European Council talked 
of easing people-to-people contacts, thus 
hinting at steps towards visa liberalisation, 
at least for some groups of travellers from 
Turkey. Here, Brussels should come forward 
with stronger commitments because deal-
ing with the issue is long overdue. Addi-
tionally, to establish itself as an objective 
and fair actor, Brussels should strike a 
balance between the internal solidarity 
principle and a realistic and impartial 
policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. This 
requires signalling that justifiable Turkish 
claims are being heard, but the methods 
that Ankara is deploying are unacceptable, 
as they fall far short of the requirements 
of international law and diplomatic norms. 
Recommendations for Turkey 
Turkey should be aware that time is work-
ing against it. Ankara is experiencing a 
rapid deterioration of its image as an eco-
nomic destination. The shift to executive 
presidentialism has brought with it the 
crippling of the trade bureaucracy and a 
fast decline in the level of trust in the judi-
ciary. French companies no longer feel 
secure in Turkey, and German business has 
time and again expressed concerns about 
the safety of Turkish personnel. Both Ger-
man and French companies have already 
started to look for alternative investment 
destinations, as manifested in the recent 
decision of Volkswagen to abort plans for 
a new plant in Turkey. 
Moreover, Ankara faces the unwelcome 
prospect of public sentiment towards Tur-
key turning sour, even in countries such as 
Italy, Spain, and Poland, where the general 
public holds positive feelings for Turkey. 
Not only are Turkey’s democratic backs-
liding and militaristic foreign policy trigger-
ing this change, but also trends towards 
right-wing populism in Europe. 
Last but not least, the Turkish leader-
ship’s clinging to some unorthodox views 
on economic matters and the country’s 
economic future risks scuppering Turkey’s 
ongoing demand for a modernised CU. The 
insistence on keeping interest rates low 
at the expense of usurping control of mone-
tary policy from the theoretically independ-
ent central bank is a case in point. Addition-
ally, despite all of its official pro-CU rhetoric, 
the Turkish government has yet to carry 
out several reforms to make a deepened 
Customs Union work. Cases in point are 
state aid, institutionalised discrimination of 
foreign tenderers, and highly non-
transparent tendering. 
A deepened Customs Union may well 
help keep Turkey close to Europe through 
its potential spill-over effects on the judicial 
system and transparency in the financing 
mechanisms used by the ruling party. Never-
theless, without a strong display of will by 
Ankara to reverse the country’s democratic 
backsliding, a deepened Customs Union 
alone will not be sufficient to keep Turkey 
in Europe. 
Dr Sinem Adar, Associate, and Dr Günter Seufert, Head, CATS, SWP, Berlin; 
Nicola Bilotta, Researcher, and Sinan Ekim, Junior Fellow, IAI, Rome; 
Aurélien Denizeau, Independent Researcher, Paris; 
Dr Dorothée Schmid, Head of Turkey and Middle East Program, Ifri;  
Ilke Toygür, Analyst, Elcano, Madrid; 
Karol Wasilewski, Head of Middle East and Africa, PISM, Warsaw. 
The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) is funded by 
Stiftung Mercator and the German Federal Foreign Office. 
 
 
 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, 2020 
All rights reserved 
This Comment reflects 
the authors’ views. 
The online version of 
this publication contains 
functioning links to other 
SWP texts and other relevant 
sources. 
SWP Comments are subject 
to internal peer review, fact-
checking and copy-editing. 
For further information on 
our quality control pro-
cedures, please visit the SWP 
website: https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/about-swp/ 
quality-management-for-
swp-publications/ 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute for 
International and 
Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 
10719 Berlin 
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1861-1761 
doi: 10.18449/2020C48 
